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 In academia, authorship on publications confers merit as well as responsibility. The 
respective disciplines adhere to their “typical” authorship practices: individuals may be named in 
alphabetical order (e.g. in economics, mathematics), ranked in decreasing level of contribution 
(e.g. biomedical sciences) or the leadership role may be listed last (e.g. laboratory sciences). 
However, there is no specific, generally accepted guidance regarding authorship distribution in 
multidisciplinary teams, something that can lead to significant tensions and even conflict. Using 
Scanlon’s Contractualism as a basis, I propose a conceptual foundation for the ethical distribution 
of authorship in multidisciplinary teams; it features four relevant principles: desert, just 
recognition, transparency and collegiality. These principles can serve in the development of a 
practical framework to support ethical and non-arbitrary authorship distribution, which hopefully 
would help reduce confusion and conflict, promote agreement and contribute to synergy in 
multidisciplinary collaborative research. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1953, James Watson and Francis Crick were named as the authors of the publication 
“Molecular Structure of Nucleic Acids; a Structure for Deoxyribose Nucleic Acid” in the 
journal Nature (Watson and Crick 1953). While historians have debated the relevance and 
importance of various discoveries in molecular science (de Chadarevian 2002; Abir-Am and 
Elliott 2000), there is little dispute as to the major significance of the discovery of the double-
helix structure of deoxyribose nucleic acid (DNA). But what of Rosalind Franklin? There is 
little mention in science manuals of the contribution of the biophysicist Rosalind Franklin to the 
discovery of the structure of DNA. Watson has admitted that he used Franklin’s unpublished 
experimental work without her knowledge, including her measurement of the repeating DNA 
unit and X-ray diffraction data showing the helical structure (Maddox 2003). While Watson and 
Crick were named on the paper, and later received the Nobel prize with a contributing colleague 
Maurice Wilkins, Franklin’s name was absent. If authorship practices at the time had 
recognized everyone who had substantially contributed to the research, perhaps science history 
would tell a different story. One can only wonder how Rosalind Franklin’s career would have 
progressed had her contribution been acknowledged. Would she have had more support leading 
to more scientific discoveries that could have shaped science in a different manner?  
The expression “publish or perish” is an imperative in most disciplines, from the 
humanities and social sciences to the fundamental sciences, the health sciences and other 
applied sciences (Clapham 2005; Beasley 2005; De Rond and Miller 2005; van Dalen and 
Henkens 2012). Authorship of published works is considered an increasingly important reward 
in the contemporary system of science (Latour 1989; Latour and Woolgar 1979). A researcher’s 
record of publication is a key criterion in the hiring, promotion, and tenure of researchers and 
professors, and a central consideration in deliberations to award grants, contracts, fellowships 
and prizes (Shamoo and Resnik 2009). 
Issues surrounding authorship – i.e., who should be named an author, in what order, 
based on what contribution, and with what responsibility – have increased in number and 
complexity with the significant growth of collaborative research, especially when it involves 
contributors from different disciplines, countries, and cultures. Unlike the relatively small team 
that discovered the structure of DNA in 1953, contemporary team research may include 
hundreds of members who may be named as authors on a publication. For example, in 
genetics/genomics research, large teams are the norm; the study of “The Complete Genome 
Sequence of the Gram-Positive Bacterium Bacillus Subtilis” (Kunst et al. 1997) had 151 
authors, albeit an unusually large number for this field. While team research has become 
commonplace in the natural sciences, it has also achieved greater prominence in the social 
sciences where relatively smaller collaborative models now account for over half of research 
projects (Endersby 1996; Gingras and Archambault 2006). Collaborative practices in the 
humanities occur to a much lesser extent, with only 10% of papers being collaborative; the 
remaining 90% are sole authored publications (Gingras and Archambault 2006). 
This transition from sole authorship to multi-authorship reflects the evolution toward 
strategies of collaborative research that are broader in scope and centered on addressing 
complex problems that require the competencies of researchers from many disciplines. An 
individual researcher who shuns multidisciplinary collaboration and attempts to “go it alone” 
without the necessary expertise and knowledge from other highly specialized (sub)fields may 
face the daunting prospect of falling short, i.e., being seen as a “jack-of-all-trades and master of 
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none”. As a result, new or “hybrid research fields” have been created by integrating knowledge 
from multiple disciplines (Barkovic 2010, p.954). For example, women’s studies draws upon 
the contributions of scholars from political science, sociology, philosophy and history; and High 
Energy physics may involve scholars specializing in condensed-matter physics, the life 
sciences, material science, chemistry, and nano-science.1  
For team members, the order of authorship may be critical, especially when it ranks the 
contribution of individuals and as such, bestows more or less prestige and responsibility. 
Disciplines such as psychology or computer sciences often list individuals in decreasing order 
of importance of contribution (Bennett and Taylor 2003). But, to distribute authorship in this 
manner, the team must distinguish whose work is more valuable and merits higher ranking. This 
is not an easy task, especially when the nature or types of contributions vary (e.g., intellectual, 
technical). In laboratory based sciences and in large biomedical teams, individuals may be 
named in decreasing order of importance of contribution and importance may be attributed to 
the last author as Principal investigator; this underscores one’s leadership role in obtaining 
funding or grants, managing a research laboratory or mentoring students. In disciplines such as 
sociology, economics and mathematics, authors are often named in alphabetical order (Van 
Praag and Van Praag 2008); this approach might seem more egalitarian but it fails to indicate 
and thus recognize the nature, extent and relative importance of the various authors’ 
contributions within a team. Further, while particular authorship distribution practices may be 
considered “the norm” in certain disciplines (i.e., obvious to all members of the discipline), they 
may be totally opaque or completely foreign to researchers from other disciplines. The differing 
meanings and values inherent in the authorship norms of various disciplines can be confusing 
and even contradictory. This can give rise to disputes and ethical challenges when determining 
authorship. What may be valued and considered an appropriate and acceptable authorship 
practice in one disciplinary culture may be considered unimportant, unworthy of authorship, or 
even unethical in another discipline. 
The term “multidisciplinary research” is defined here as all research that includes more 
than one discipline; several different types of multidisciplinary research (e.g., interdisciplinary, 
cross-disciplinary, trans-disciplinary) have been the topic of much scholarly discussion 
(Sulmasy and Sugarman 2010), but these distinctions are beyond the scope of this paper. The 
co-existence of multiple authorship practices and disciplinary norms, and the likelihood of 
significant disputes around authorship distribution, makes multidisciplinary teams an apt 
context in which to investigate what could constitute basic principles of ethical authorship. This 
is not to say that authorship issues are not present in disciplinary contexts; nor is it to say that 
the authorship orders used in different disciplines are inherently right or wrong, but rather that 
there is greater disagreement and discord when different norms conflict in authorship decisions. 
These disagreements in multidisciplinary teams (especially in health based sciences) have 
created much debate in recent years, which gives impetus to continued reflection, and perhaps 
even to means of changing guidance and behavior.  
In this paper, I present a theoretical approach – inspired by Scanlon’s theory of 
contractualism as presented in his book What We Owe Each Other (Scanlon 1998) – as a 
foundation for elaborating methods for fair or ethical authorship distribution, and in particular, 
                                                
1  In this article, I define “discipline” quite broadly as an institutionalized and recognized set of knowledge, 
approaches and/or methods used towards the evolution of science. I am aware that the definition of “discipline” has 
been a debate for quite some time in the philosophy of science, but this debate is outside the scope of the paper. 
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for decisions regarding the order of authors of multi-authored multidisciplinary academic 
publications. I begin by providing a brief background section that includes an overview of the 
relevant literature on authorship collaboration to shed light on important contextual elements 
and also to underscore the lack of theoretically grounded guidance for authorship distribution 
(mainly with regards to authorship order). I then show how Scanlon’s contractualism, and the 
application of certain ethical concepts – such as specific interpretations of desert, just 
recognition, transparency and collegiality – can contribute to a sound theoretical foundation for 
the development of an eventual practical framework (which is beyond the scope of this paper) 
to support ethical and non-arbitrary authorship distribution in multidisciplinary team 
publications. 
 
BACKGROUND   
Authorship and Collaboration in Science 
The emphasis on collaboration in science started during the Big Science era after World 
War II (Cronin 2005; Katz and Martin 1997). Governments recognized the benefits of investing 
massively in science; projects became significantly bigger and more complex, necessitating 
more diverse expertise and greater collaboration (McClellan and Dorn 1999). This extended 
beyond the familiar, traditional model of scientific inquiry as a solitary endeavor. While it may 
be argued that throughout history, some degree of collaboration has existed among researchers 
through the exchange of ideas, the sharing of methods and cooperation with technical laboratory 
assistants (Biagioli 1999), one or very few individuals were considered authors. In 
contemporary science, researchers collaborate as members of a team where tasks and 
responsibilities are assigned, and ultimately acknowledged or reflected in multi-authored 
published works. 
While definitions of scientific authorship may differ to some extent, there is general 
agreement in the literature as well as in academic practice, that individuals who “contribute 
substantially” to a research project merit some level of authorship (Louis et al. 2008). However, 
the term, “substantial contribution” remains vague and largely undefined (Smith and Williams-
Jones 2011). In some fields, especially in biomedical sciences, individuals might also need to 
participate in the critical revision or drafting of the manuscript and give final approval of the 
manuscript. While an increased number of collaborators may indeed indicate more contribution 
(because of more labor intensive projects), this may not necessarily be the case. Individuals 
might simply be contributing to different projects in smaller amounts and they could seek to 
bolster the quantity of their published works without in fact contributing or collaborating more 
to the general scientific enterprise.  
In the scholarly literature about authorship, there has been considerable interest in 
practices that do not respect the concept of “substantial contribution”. For example, “guest”, 
“gift”, “unjustified” and “honorary” authorship broadly include naming an individual as an 
author when they did not substantially contribute to the research, thus receiving undeserved 
credit and recognition (Ross et al. 2008; Street et al. 2010; B. Moffatt 2011). Conversely, 
“ghost” authorship – the omission of an individual who has contributed substantially to a study 
– has also been discussed as an important ethical issue in the authorship literature (Anstey 2014; 
Matías-Guiu and García-Ramos 2011; Mowatt et al. 2002), especially in university-industry 
relations with the pharmaceutical sector (Sismondo 2009; Barton Moffatt and Elliott 2007; 
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Lexchin et al. 2003). In order to hide financial conflict of interests, individuals working for or 
being paid by pharmaceutical companies may refuse authorship (becoming a ‘ghost author’) 
and assign authorship to another individual or team (likely from the no-profit sector i.e. a 
university) to eliminate any concerns or doubts about bias in research.  
Empirical studies of researcher self-reporting of behavior (e.g., surveys, interviews) 
show alarming rates of authorship issues. For example, Flanagin and colleagues surveyed 
corresponding authors who reported honorary authorship, ghost authorship, or both, and found 
that these were present in 21% of medical articles (Wislar et al. 2011). Mowatt and colleagues 
surveyed authors of Cochrane reviews who declared that 39% of articles have evidence of 
honorary authorship and 9% have evidence of ghost authorship (Mowatt et al. 2002). By simply 
looking at a list of authors on a byline, a reader will be hard-pressed to know if there is guest or 
ghost authorship. In many cases where there is collaboration, a reader will have little idea who 
truly contributed to what tasks or ideas, thus creating a general “obfuscation of authorship” 
(Bennett and Taylor 2003). Without knowing who did what in a research group – especially in 
large research teams – journals, institutions and funding councils do not know who should 
receive credit or who should be held accountable if questionable practices like research 
misconduct (such as fabrication, falsification and plagiarism) have occurred. In a highly 
multidisciplinary team, there may actually be no one individual who can vouch for the project 
as a whole because of the necessity of so many different specializations. Further, if authorship is 
seen in its traditional mode as being an individual who is accountable for the project as a whole, 
the highly multidisciplinary project could even be construed as “authorless” (Kukla 2012). 
This obfuscation of authorship has led to confusion and much debate, especially in the 
biomedical sciences. Consequently, a series of propositions were suggested as ways to replace 
authorship. For example, “corporate authorship” has been proposed where the team or group 
name may take precedence over the names of individual contributors in the byline, as in the 
case of the GUSTO team research (GUSTO 1993). 2  However, this last option is rarely 
implemented (Weeks, Wallace, and Kimberly 2004); many journals still require that individuals 
be named somewhere in the publication (e.g., in a footnote or endnote) to ensure a degree of 
individual accountability for the publication. Medical editors and scholars have argued that 
authorship could be replaced with contributorship (Smith 2012; Smith 1997; Rennie, Yank, and 
Emanuel 1997). Under this approach, individuals would be listed for their specific task(s) (e.g., 
study design, data collection, analysis, drafting of the manuscript), and as such, they would have 
a more direct link to, and accountability for, their contribution. A contributorship section has 
been added to a substantial number of well reputed journals (Rennie 2001). Recently in 2014, 
Allen and colleagues created a taxonomy to better categorize contributorship (Allen et al. 2014). 
However, the authorship concept has remained predominant (sometimes co-existing with 
contributorship), and it is still sought after as the most significant of metrics by which 
researchers are evaluated. The challenges in authorship distribution have not been entirely 
resolved by contributorship. Contributorship may augment transparency – noting who did what 
tasks – but it does not clarify who should receive more or less credit. As such, contributorship 
will not suffice to ‘fix’ all authorship issues.  
The considerable number of authorship distribution issues has led to a growing 
recognition of the importance of fairly distributing authorship (Shamoo and Resnik 2009, p.69), 
                                                
2 More discussion of this model will be presented in the section on transparency. 
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even if fairness remains – as I will discuss later – somewhat ill defined. There is growing 
awareness that unfair and misleading practices such as those mentioned above not only create 
doubt about “who did what” and “who is responsible for what”, but can also undermine trust 
and confidence in the quality of the research itself and the reputation of the research community 
more generally. The scientific endeavor is arguably founded on trust in, and the truthfulness of 
its various elements, including:  sound methodology, critical acumen, systematic rigor in testing 
and measurement, the mitigation of distortion and bias, and evidence-based findings. It stands 
to reason that if researchers are ready to lie about authorship, then there might be other elements 
within their research that are not truthful (Wager 2009).  
Journal editor organizations have shown initiative and developed authorship guidelines or 
recommendations that are receiving attention in the literature on authorship (Tsao and Roberts 
2009; Wager 2007). These guidelines or recommendations are intended to promote publication 
ethics and have been quite effective in stimulating dialogue about authorship issues. Three 
major organizations occupy center stage, each having developed their own authorship guidance 
or recommendations: the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors (ICMJE) (2015), 
the World Association of Medical Editors (WAME) (2013a), and the Committee on Publication 
Ethics (COPE) (2013). The most explicit and detailed authorship criteria are found in the 
ICMJE recommendations, which state that authorship should be based on:  
1.   Substantial contributions to the conception or design of the work; or the 
acquisition, analysis, or interpretation of data for the work; AND 
2.   Drafting the work or revising it critically for important intellectual content; 
AND 
3.   Final approval of the version to be published; AND 
4.   Agreement to be accountable for all aspects of the work in ensuring that 
questions related to the accuracy or integrity of any part of the work are 
appropriately investigated and resolved. (ICMJE 2015) 
Alongside such guidance, specific journals have often remained very vague regarding 
authorship either referring to the guidance of a journal editor organization or simply mentioning 
that authors should agree on the final manuscript (Wager, 2007). 
Once the criteria or qualifications for authorship have been determined and authors 
named, decisions must be made concerning the order of authors. The ICMJE guidelines 
mentions a “collective responsibility” (ICMJE 2014 p.2) to distribute authorship, which may 
suggest some form of democratic decision making, an approach also found in WAME 
documents. WAME mentions that “The authors themselves should decide the order in which 
authors are listed in an article” (WAME 2013b). Interestingly, the order of authorship would be 
the outcome of a simple agreement based on “many different criteria” (WAME 2013b). But, 
there is little clarity regarding relevant or acceptable criteria. COPE recommends that an 
authorship agreement be developed and adhered to by team members in order to foster constant 
communication from the outset and throughout the research process, in order to limit disputes. 
However, COPE does not outline the content of such an agreement.  
In a self-governed system such as academia, an open and democratic forum may indeed 
help to mitigate disputes and conflicts among team members, but it cannot pre-empt or 
eliminate collusion that intentionally exploits some members or that perpetuates discriminatory 
practices. Further, the differing disciplinary cultures and practices of individuals in 
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multidisciplinary teams can make decision-making and consensus on authorship particularly 
challenging. I argue that guidance should have a sufficiently inclusive and broadly accepted 
theoretical grounding in order to mitigate conflict or discord. This would produce decisions 
based on a sound and ethical rationale, rather than power relations, traditions or belief structures 
which may no longer be adequate. 
While editor organizations (ICMJE, WAME, COPE) have definitely stimulated debate 
regarding authorship criteria, there is no unanimity on the subject, and discussion remains quite 
limited when it comes to authorship order. Also, the critique has been made that rules, like 
those of ICMJE, are insufficiently flexible to adapt to the different research contexts. This may 
be the case, a fortiori, in multidisciplinary research where the scope of the scientific inquiry is 
complex, and the nature and value of contributions are diverse. While scholars have mentioned 
the need for more discussion about authorship distribution and order (Lambert-Chan 2013), 
none have offered practical, detailed or ethically justified guidance. This paper will propose the 
theoretical foundation for the eventual development of a practical ethical framework for 
distributing authorship fairly. 
 
CONTRACTUALISM IN AUTHORSHIP DISTRIBUTION 
As noted in the previous section, not all agreements are ethical. Consider the 
arrangement where a student agrees to put her supervisor as first author on a paper in order to 
be in the latter’s good graces, regardless of the fact that the supervisor did not contribute to the 
research; this is considered a form of gift authorship. So, while agreement might be one element 
of ethical theory, it is not in and of itself validation or proof of ethical behavior. Individuals 
have agreed (some more freely than others), and still do, to accept slavery, racism and sexism. I 
do, however, think that the dynamic or process of agreement can facilitate the development of 
ethical behavior, especially in a team setting. Comstock (Comstock 2013) has developed a 
Responsible Conduct of Research (RCR) framework that relies extensively on agreement and 
mentions the notion of contractualism, although he does not expand on this theory and gives 
little detail as to how it can guide the distribution of authorship. 3  However, I agree that 
Comstock was heading in the right direction and so I intend to show that contractualism can 
indeed be effective in helping to address certain RCR issues, namely, authorship.  
Different interpretations of contractualism have been at the heart of classic ethical 
theories such as those of Rousseau (1762) and Kant (1785), as well as a central notion in the 
works of contemporary philosophers such as Rawls (1971), Daniels (2000; 1990) and Scanlon 
(1998). The basic idea is that the ethical principles, rules or values governing our actions can be 
justified or deemed appropriate when they are the result of a hypothetical agreement between 
individuals. In the words of Darwell, “whether an action is right or wrong must depend on 
whether the act accords with or violates principles that are, or would be, the object of suitable 
agreement” (Darwell 2003, p.1). By referring to agreements as hypothetical, I follow these 
scholars in referring broadly to agreements to which individuals could reasonably agree. But I 
will focus, in this paper, on one particular version of contractualism, that of Thomas Scanlon as 
                                                
3 These shortcomings can be explained by the fact that Comstock’s book concerns the responsible conduct of 
research in general. To tackle such a wide range of issues, Comstock draws upon egoism, contractualism, moral 
rights and utilitarian theory. Contractualism and authorship distribution are but a small portion of his work.  
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developed in his book What We Owe Each Other (Scanlon 1998),4 and I will argue that it 
applies particularly well to the context of authorship distribution.  
Scanlon grounds his theory on a central statement about what constitutes a wrong action, 
rather than defining what is right: “An act is wrong if its performance under the circumstances 
would be disallowed by any set of principles for the general regulation of behavior that no one 
could reasonably reject as a basis for informed unforced general agreement” (Scanlon 1998, 
p.153). By refraining from defining precisely what the right action is, Scanlon provides room to 
accommodate a broad range of possible right actions while still acknowledging that unethical 
actions or wrongness exist. At the outset of his book, Scanlon describes the primal and 
foundational nature of reason in normative thought. He states that reasons are propositions (e.g., 
judgments about empirical facts or psychological states) that count “in favor of some judgment-
sensitive attitude” 5 (Scanlon 1998, p.56). As such, a reason is not an ontological element but 
rather a proposition with a particular status or significance that gives it normative force. 
Consider the expression X gives me reason to do Y. This statement points to X as justification 
to act; in effect, X, is a proposition that has normative force as it provides “good reason” as the 
impetus for action. 
According to Scanlon’s theory, values are not metaphysical or teleological. There is no 
absolute, universal list of values that applies systematically to every context and all 
circumstances. Simply put, we value those things that we have reason to consider as valuable. 
Depending on one’s reasons, the nature and order of importance of values vary; what we value 
takes diverse forms, e.g., pleasure, friendship, well-being and achievement of artistic and/or 
intellectual excellence. Also, what is valuable in one context or at one time may not always be 
valued as much or at all; a value may not be seen as reasonable in certain contexts or under 
certain conditions. Since the circumstances of our actions often change, Scanlon points to the 
need to consider the context as well as the intention behind an action, or what Scanlon calls the 
“moral motivation” (Matravers 2003, p.4). For example, while friendship is valued in many 
situations in our personal life, it may seem unreasonable and inappropriate to value friendship 
more than actual contribution in distributing authorship in a research publication. We should 
thus revise the reasonableness of values on an ongoing basis according to changes in context.  
According to Scanlon, it is reasonable for individuals to take into account the reasons 
that they, as well as others, have to justify an action. This notion of “mutual recognition” is 
central in that it is an acknowledgment of others as rational equals. Mutual recognition is not 
only important in the process of practical reasoning, it also promotes morality; we seek a moral 
life because we exist in relation to others and we seek to justify our reasons in a way that others 
cannot unreasonably reject (Scanlon 1998, p.162). There is a degree of fairness and equality 
inherent in the notion of mutual recognition; no one rational individual is prima facie more 
important than another. Agreement between equals includes the notion of reciprocity where one 
respects the agreement knowing that others will do the same.  
When deciding whether and to what extent an act is right or wrong, we must 
hypothetically consider principles that are mutually recognized and relevant in the given 
context. As such, a principle reflects a moral rationale or reasoning in support of a specific 
                                                
4 I will not consider Scanlon’s earlier article entitled ‘Contractualism and Utilitarianism’ (Scanlon 1982) since his 
views changed substantially in his later work, notably by omitting reference to utilitarianism. 
5 For an attitude to be judgment-sensitive it must be “under the control of reason” (see Scanlon 1998 p.272). 
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action in a given context. For example, if we acknowledge that it is important to be completely 
transparent about data and analysis in the verification of an experiment, we might conclude that 
there is sufficient reason to abide by a principle of transparency in publication, if in a given 
context there is no other perspective that makes this principle unreasonable. However, in the 
context where maintaining confidentiality and respecting the privacy of participants is 
paramount, the principle of transparency may not apply to the same extent or in the same 
manner as in the previous situation. In considering various principles, one must understand that 
the importance, relevance and applicability of a principle depend on the context of the action. 
 
Why use Contractualism as a Theoretical Base in Authorship Distribution? 
There are four main reasons why Scanlon’s theory of contractualism applies nicely to 
authorship distribution:  
1.   It provides the necessary flexibility to adapt to the many different contexts of 
authorship distribution in multidisciplinary collaborations. Reasons to adopt or exclude 
certain principles may differ depending on team size, the nature of the research area, 
the disciplines involved and the geographical location of team members, to name but a 
few contextual factors. This form of contractualism allows us to take into consideration 
the values and goals that are already considered reasonable and valued in the academic 
community, such as: rigor, competence, trustworthiness, and knowledge development. 
This is an important consideration in that it allows for the subsequent development of a 
fair and practical framework within the existing (albeit imperfect) value system.6 
 
2.   It is useful in developing principles that allow us to challenge authorship practices that 
have not been questioned in a reasoned manner and that should be updated to reflect 
advances in authorship ethics, emerging research issues, contexts and present-day 
values. For example, 17th century copyright (when the concept of authorship was born) 
was created to mirror existing class structures and as such, it discredited many 
contributors from being granted authorship (Biagioli 1999). Traditional practices that 
continue to enable exploitation or perpetuate unethical behavior need to be rationally 
and reasonably challenged and remedied.   
 
3.  The notion of mutual recognition opens the way to a fair and reasoned process wherein 
individuals are considered equals when making agreements and establishing principles 
and frameworks. This approach counterbalances to some extent the hierarchical nature 
and power dynamics of academia. The goal is not to eliminate hierarchy based on 
knowledge, which is necessary in teaching and mentoring relationships. The 
professor/supervisor with ‘greater knowledge’ necessarily occupies a position of 
authority and power, as she/he is responsible for evaluating and mentoring the student; 
this is an entirely reasonable arrangement. However, if we apply reason and mutual 
recognition in distributing authorship, the less powerful party (e.g., the student, 
research assistant, technician) should still receive equal consideration. A reasonable 
and acceptable agreement would take into account the viewpoints of all team members, 
                                                
6 As already mentioned, the development of such a framework would be the focus of future work, and thus is not 
presented in this paper. 
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including students, researchers, coordinators, research assistants, and principal 
investigators.  
 
4.  Value is not limited to one object or element, such as well-being or utility; Scanlon 
considers the potential of value as a plural concept. This is particularly important and 
relevant in academia because of the multiple forms of value (intellectual or technical) 
as well as the value of reputation or the well-being of the individuals. I agree with 
Scanlon that many justice theories, especially those focused on the just distribution of 
necessary goods and services, mistakenly focus on one type of value, i.e., well-being, 
in measuring ethical conduct (Scanlon 1998, 110-143). While important, well-being is 
but one (insufficient) consideration in the scientific context, where multiple values are 
relevant and deserve consideration.  
 
Limitations of Contractualism in Authorship Distribution  
As with any moral theory, contractualism has its limitations and its critics, but I will 
limit my review of these to focus instead on the articulation of the theoretical basis for an 
eventual ethical authorship framework.  
Briefly, Hughes and De Wije (2001) argue that the words “reasonably reject”, which 
determine wrongness in Scanlon’s theory, are too vague. However, as in any theory, a certain 
level of vagueness is necessary to be applicable to the many contexts and arguments in moral 
theory. Another important critique is the so-called aggregation problem (Hooker 2002), i.e., that 
the views of the greater number of individuals should have more importance than those of a few 
individuals or even a single person, as would argue many utilitarians (Mill 1870). To be fair, 
however, Scanlon’s argument is built on the notion that an act is right or wrong depending on 
the reasonableness of the argument, and not solely on the number of individuals who make an 
argument. Reasonableness thus does not always result in the aggregation problem, but it 
remains sometimes present. 
Since the focus of my work, here, is on laying the groundwork for the eventual 
development of an ethical authorship framework, one practical shortcoming is particularly 
relevant. While Scanlon’s statement on contractualism is helpful in discerning wrong or 
unreasonable principles for the distribution of authorship, it does not tell us exactly what to do 
when more than one authorship distribution method and order might be reasonable to team 
members. In a later section on collegiality, I will discuss an approach to apply more fair 
procedures7 to enable team members to agree on an ethical order of authorship in a collegial and 
respectful manner. 
 
DEVELOPING ETHICAL AUTHORSHIP PRINCIPLES USING CONTRACTUALISM 
In this section, I will argue that in the distribution of authorship, the specific 
interpretation of certain principles such as desert, equality, transparency, and collegiality can be 
                                                
7 I have decided to limit the discussion about procedural justice in this paper because I consider it a more practical 
consideration that will be better addressed once further empirical data is collected on this issue and the context of 
authorship distribution is better understood. 
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considered reasonable according to Scanlon’s theory. As previously stated, contractualism does 
not provide one best decision or outcome; but it does help us to justify or refute principles that 
can be used in deliberations concerning authorship distribution. Careful reflection, reflexivity 
(following Anthony Gidden’s (1986) view of self-awareness) and practical judgment are 
necessary for team members to agree upon principles that meet the test of reasonableness within 
diverse contextual realities. Once this exercise is completed, principles can be applied in 
determining the selection of an authorship order. I will focus on those principles that are 
primary in authorship distribution and order; they do not, however, constitute an exhaustive list. 
 
Merit and Desert 
Although the words “desert” and “merit” may be used interchangeably in common 
parlance to talk about certain aspects of justice and responsibility – “he got what he deserved” 
or “she will get merit through authorship” – these are not concepts used to explain or describe 
fairness in philosophy or social theory. Michael Young first introduced the term “meritocracy” 
in his book, The Rise of Meritocracy (Young 1958), a political satire about a highly meritocratic 
society structured according to levels of intelligence. His dystopia, which portrayed a ridiculous 
and unreasonable society, was intended to persuade the British Labour government of the 1950s 
that the application of the principle of merit was unjust (Dench 2006). Similarly, and consistent 
with its roots in justice theory, contemporary political philosophy does not attribute the same 
importance to merit and desert that it gives to equality, equity and welfare. In liberal egalitarian 
philosophy, authors such as John Rawls value highly the principles of liberty and equality, 
while libertarians such as Robert Nozick or Milton Friedman have favored entitlement theory 
based on the respect of individual rights (Olsaretti 2003). According to Lewis, merit is refuted 
on the basis that it creates social differentiation that is commonly rejected as unjust (Lewis 
1998).  
Rawls’ theory of justice does not define individuals as responsible for or deserving of the 
native endowments which they receive in life. As Rawls notes:  
It seems to be one of the fixed points of our considered judgments that no one 
deserves his place in the distribution of native endowments, any more than one 
deserves one’s initial starting place in society. The assertion that a man deserves 
the superior character that enables him to make the effort to cultivate his abilities 
is equally problematic; for his character depends in large part upon fortunate 
family and social circumstance for which he can claim no credit (Rawls 1971, 
p.104).  
Even the willingness to make an effort, to try and so to be deserving in the ordinary sense is 
itself dependent in practice upon family and social circumstances. This underscores the 
skepticism about responsibility and free will in contemporary justice theory (in political 
philosophy) and has undermined any recourse to desert and merit (Pojman and McLeod 1999). 
But the disregard or dismissal of desert, merit and even responsibility-based arguments is at 
odds with many areas of ethics (e.g., professional ethics or organizational ethics) where 
responsibility is a key principle. It is important to note that political philosophers have largely 
focused on distributive justice to create fair institutions. And while I initially thought that fair 
distribution of authorship would be comparable to fair distribution in political philosophy, I 
have subsequently come to a different conclusion.  
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If we focus on the context of authorship distribution for multidisciplinary research, it is 
reasonable to acknowledge that a theoretical foundation with different principles is warranted 
and that the goal of “fairness” still applies. Concepts of desert and merit can, I argue, reasonably 
apply in a team setting that is already institutionalized. Academic institutions have specific 
tasks and obligations that involve a complex mix of professional ethics, organizational ethics 
and justice. While notions of need and welfare linked to primary rights (such as the right to life, 
nourishment, etc.) found in justice theories are not the central principles or goals of academic 
institutions or in team research, fairness in team dynamics is nonetheless important. While I 
agree with many political philosophers that equity, equality and welfare are key principles in 
distributing essential primary goods or rights, desert may be more relevant and reasonable as a 
principle underlying fairness in the academic context.  
In discussing authorship, I will thus use Louis Pojman’s (1999) definitions of merit and 
desert. Pojman describes merit as “any feature or quality that is the basis for distributing 
positive attributions as praise, rewards and prizes” (Pojman 1999, p.86). This quality may be a 
natural endowment such as beauty, strength or intelligence. For example, a professor may merit 
tenure because of her brilliance; even though she may have achieved an excellent publication 
record with relative ease or less effort than other colleagues, she still merits her reward or career 
advancement. “Desert on the other hand is typically or paradigmatically connected with action, 
since it rests on what we voluntarily do or produce. It is typically connected with intention or 
effort” (Pojman 1999, p.86). A professor deserves tenure, in part because of her contribution to 
knowledge, but also because of her engagement in teaching and mentoring, involvement with 
administration, etc., all of which require effort and work, even if the professor may be more 
adept at these acts than other colleagues. The notion of effort and work is the action base for 
desert in this case. To summarize, people may receive merit for things for which they have not 
worked, such as natural beauty, innate strength or intelligence; but it is only in cases where 
individuals make a choice to use their talents through action that they deserve a prize or reward.  
Research involves going through the often tedious processes (e.g., experiments, data 
collection), alongside more creative or rewarding activities (e.g., idea generation, analysis, 
writing) and these are choices that individuals make. These choices result in an effort to 
contribute to research that confers desert whereby one deserves praise for scientific 
contribution. This is consistent with Scanlon’s contractualist approach; he mentions that it is 
often the case that an individual cannot reasonably reject outcomes that are sensitive to one’s 
choice (Scanlon 1998, p.251). Choice is a precursor to responsibility which is also important in 
the framework of desert.8 Although individuals may receive credit or merit through authorship, 
we usually only consider this merit ethical if it is deserved; that is, the individual performed an 
action (e.g., work) that resulted in a contribution (e.g., a scientific article). If the author has not 
contributed but still obtains merit through gift authorship, we consider this undeserved and in 
Scanlon’s words, unreasonable. Accordingly, the central concept in authorship distribution is 
desert since merit is really a consequence or result of desert. 
In the literature on desert, we find Feinberg’s classic expression: “S deserves X by virtue 
of P” (Feinberg 1974, p.61). In the case of authorship distribution, S would be an individual 
(professor, researcher, student, technician, etc.) who participates in the research process. Since 
                                                
8 While in the case of authorship distribution desert may be morally justified, I am not saying that outcomes are 
deserved if a choice is taken in all situations. Scanlon notes that the value of choice is “conditional and relative” 
(Scanlon, 1998, p.262). 
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authorship is our object of study, X would be authorship with the ensuing implications 
regarding credit (or merit) and accountability. Finally, there must be an action (P) that makes 
the individual deserving of authorship. David Miller mentions that the challenge with 
Feinberg’s account of desert is to define P more precisely because “primary desert judgments 
are based on performances for which the agents in question are responsible, and which we 
appraise either positively or negatively” (Miller 2003, p.27). What Miller calls the primary 
desert judgment (the P in Feinberg’s expression) is also typically called the desert base 
(Feldman 1995). 
 As mentioned previously, authors and academic journals are increasingly adopting the 
notion of “substantial contribution” as a central criterion for attributing authorship (regardless 
of the order used). The value that we put on contribution makes this a reasonable desert base. 
But in determining substantial contribution, should we give more credit to the amount of work 
or effort, or to the quality and importance of the act for the results achieved? In other words, 
should individuals who work harder or exert greater effort (e.g., do more writing) deserve more 
credit (in the form of authorship) than others whose quantitative contribution may be less but 
could also be more qualitatively valuable (e.g., a key idea or technical analysis)? While there 
may be some rationale for acknowledging hard work, in practice, there is no plausible or 
reasonable way to objectively quantify or measure intellectual effort.9 As with grading student 
essays, or reviewing grants or article submissions, the evaluation is on the final product and not 
on the effort involved. While it may be harsh to say, funding or praising a hard working 
researcher who lacks the competence or ability to contribute to the production of valuable 
research results (including the development ideas, methodological innovation, analysis or 
results) and advance the collective body of knowledge can be considered a waste of scarce 
resources.  
 
Why use desert as a reasonable principle in the distribution of authorship? 
Desert can be considered a reasonable principle in the distribution of authorship for 
several reasons. First, desert is a reasonable and practical way to link and clarify the concepts of 
responsibility and credit; responsibility and merit are seen as two sides of the same coin (Rennie 
and Flanagin 1994). Some have argued that credit should be disregarded and that only 
responsibility should be considered in authorship. For example, Clement states that “journal 
authorship discussions should never involve the allocation of credit, a relatively easy part; 
instead they should focus on allocation of accountability or responsibility, a more difficult part” 
(Clement 2013, p.3). He is right in pointing out that responsibility deserves greater prominence 
in authorship attribution than it has, and that it should not be overshadowed by credit. However, 
the distribution of credit separately from accountability and responsibility is unreasonable since 
one implies the other and both are integral to authorship. If you are credited with achieving a 
result, you are also held accountable and responsible for that result to some degree. It is 
reasonable to hypothesize that the sense of responsibility and accountability for one’s work can 
influence behavior and mitigate the occurrence of unethical or dubious practices. Since 
responsibility for results in a collaborative team effort is to some extent shared, then there may 
be a tendency for individuals to divert any blame or direct responsibility for errors or poor 
                                                
9 This does not mean that effort and hard work are never to be acknowledged. It simply means that they are not 
considered in the specifics of authorship.  
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outcomes to other members, to the team leadership generally or to the team collectively 
(LaFollette 1992). 
As previously mentioned, the distinction between merit and desert is that desert involves 
a choice. An individual researcher chooses to contribute and this decision confers a certain level 
of responsibility on that individual for his/her contribution to the research. Desert is based on 
actions that are the responsibility of the individual and excludes those elements that are solely 
based on natural endowment or social circumstances. This does not mean that choices are not 
influenced by external factors (e.g., financing, career advancement), but simply that the 
individual remains a free agent to a reasonable extent. It is in choosing to accept responsibility 
for a contribution that an individual deserves to be an author. For example, in a team project, a 
post-doctoral researcher chooses to participate in a research project and is responsible for data 
collection and analysis as well as a critical review of the final paper. If the paper is published, 
the post-doctoral researcher will be among the authors on the by-line. Because she was 
responsible for the contribution, she deserves authorship and the resulting merit (or credit). 
Moreover, because she was responsible for certain tasks, she remains accountable for that 
contribution. Since desert is based in part on individual responsibility, it confers a level of 
accountability that is highly valued and necessary in academia, as discussed in the RCR 
literature.  
To promote integrity in research, it is necessary for individuals to always be responsible 
for their contributions; contribution and responsibility should never be separated. The notion of 
responsibility should not, however, be confused with stewardship or the role of “guarantor”, 
concepts that refer to the leadership responsibility of certain individuals for the entire project, 
including the management of team competencies and resources (e.g., how all the pieces fit 
together, securing research funds) to achieve the research objectives. The role of steward, 
usually played by the Principal Investigator (PI), is often one of coordination, oversight, and 
leadership. This does diminish the responsibility of other members of the group; they are still 
responsible for a contribution in that they have an obligation to do specific tasks with integrity. 
Individuals are responsible for the quality of their own work even if they are in a large team and 
are not the only author named on the byline. When there are many responsible individuals, 
typically roles are defined such that some are assigned greater responsibility for certain tasks 
than others. In keeping with the notion of integrity, I will use the term responsible contribution 
as the desert base for authorship. Responsible contribution is the outcome of choices regarding 
the research project, such as the methods applied, data included or excluded, or selection of 
concepts. 
Responsibility for contribution is used in ranking individuals and is a precursor to future 
credit; the one who is responsible for the most contribution is often said to deserve the most 
authorship (usually expressed as first or last author), and thus greater credit and accountability. 
This conceptual clarification of the link between credit and responsibility (illustrated in Figure 
1) is necessary because in the definition of authorship, key concepts such as responsibility, 
accountability, merit, and credit have generally been lumped together without clarification. 
Establishing a clear link from responsibility to contribution at the planning stage of research 
would arguably help to foster a more organized, collaborative team dynamic. In using the 
concept of desert, I distinguish two different types of responsibility; responsibility for the 
contribution (or the task of research) and accountability after publication. Individuals remain 
accountable for their contribution because they are responsible for their contribution. The link 
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between the amount of contribution and the amount of accountability and merit is only possible 
if the individual deserved authorship. This makes the desert principle necessary but not 
sufficient to this conceptual approach to understanding authorship.  
 
Figure 1: Using desert in relation to responsibility, contribution, authorship, credit and 
accountability 
 
Another reason to consider desert is that it can help in determining choice of authorship 
order. If we state that authorship is linked to a certain amount of responsible contribution 
through desert, then the order could reflect this fact. If it is possible to appraise and thus 
differentiate contributions, one could use decreasing order of contribution to name authors. This 
would also be reasonable since individuals who made the ‘greatest contributions’ would be read 
first and receive the most praise; of course, this is particularly true when only the names of the 
first author (e.g., Smith et al.) or the first three authors (Smith, Hughes and Jones et al.) are 
cited in a text; this is clearly not an issue in numbered citation styles (e.g., Vancouver where no 
names are cited in the text). The concept of ‘greatest contribution’ remains vague and could be 
interpreted in various ways (e.g. the most cognitive change, the most labor intensive work, the 
most novel work). The interpretation of this notion will most likely align with the goal of the 
project. For example, if the goal of the research is predominantly to develop a novel method of 
inquiry, more value will be given to the tasks leading to this goal. Open discussion will most 
likely be necessary to understand the contributions of each individual (this will be discussed in 
greater length in the section on collegiality). 
When many individuals contribute equally, they are said to deserve equal authorship. 
However, there can only be one first author on the byline (excluding alternate and non-standard 
presentation formats such as printing names in a circle or adding equal signs between authors 
(e.g., Mullen = Kochan = Kochan = Mullan 2001)10. In such cases we can use alphabetical order 
and then state clearly that all individuals contributed equally, e.g., in a note directly under the 
author list, or in a footnote, although these options also have their limitations (as we will see in 
the section on transparency). Transparency becomes increasingly important in such cases and 
thus is also considered as a necessary principle in the distribution of authorship.  
A model that includes the notion of desert can serve as an effective appraisal mechanism 
in the ranking of authors. The desert base, which in authorship is responsible contribution, is, if 
not completely quantifiable, at least comparable and may also be valued in relation to the body 
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of work or the project as a whole. For example, in a coded interview-based analysis where the 
interview process is of critical importance to the project as a whole – even more than the initial 
drafting of the paper – that process should be given higher value and weighted accordingly. In 
work of a conceptual nature, the contribution of a novel idea and its elaboration through 
articulation in the written text would be more heavily weighted or valued. Ultimately, we would 
compare the contribution of individuals relative to one another as well as relative to the project 
as a whole. Since only the desert base (e.g., contribution) is taken into consideration in the 
appraisal process, we might reach agreement regarding decisions on authorship more quickly 
than if multiple variables such as financing or effort are also considered.  
A final argument in favor of distribution of authorship using desert is that it promotes 
the creation of knowledge. Recognition of research through authorship is at the center of the 
reward system of academia. This is not only reasonable, it is necessary. As noted by Lewis “It is 
not simply a question of pursuing excellence or of the rational utilization of resources; it is more 
basic and concerns the survival of universities as universities” (Lewis 1998, 206). Desert is 
particularly relevant in that it rewards deserving individuals who contribute to the survival of 
the university through their work. The broader institution of science has the responsibility to 
identify the more competent and productive individuals and to then distribute credit (e.g., status, 
research funds) to those who have the best chance of producing good research. 
 
Limitations of desert 
Distribution on the basis of deserved contribution is in no way a panacea and has 
limitations that, in certain cases, may render it unreasonable. Ranking may create an unhealthy 
level of competition among members and contribute to a hostile environment. As mentioned by 
Lewis, a meritocracy may create the “breeding of excessive competition” (Lewis 1998, p.202). 
Samuel Scheffler (2000) notes that desert is a very individualistic idea since it is tied to the 
actions of the individual, contrary to the more complete approach of social justice. While 
competition and individualism are realities that cannot be denied, it may be necessary to provide 
parameters as a counterbalance to also foster the productivity and synergy necessary in team 
collaborations. This will be discussed further in the section on collegiality.  
As previously stated, the comparative assessment or quantification of contributions in 
relation to the project as a whole and relative to other team members is not a simple task, 
especially when the contributions are different in nature (e.g., technical and intellectual); it can 
be like comparing apples and oranges (Smith and Williams-Jones 2011). Open communication 
and information sharing are thus essential to arrive at an understanding of others’ contributions. 
Yet, while this might be easy for a relatively small team, communication among larger teams 
(e.g., 10-100 individuals), especially when they are in different geographic areas, can be an 
insurmountable obstacle. Therefore, where practicable, and in cases where the quantity and 
nature of different contributions are sufficiently well understood, authorship distribution to 
deserving individuals on the basis of relative contribution is recommended.  
 
Fair Recognition 
When thinking of methods to fairly distribute authorship, the first normative theories 
that come to mind are theories of justice. As previously mentioned, in political philosophy these 
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are applied to the establishment of fair institutions and are not specifically applicable in the 
academic context; however, this is not to say that fairness is irrelevant in an authorship 
distribution framework. In his book Inequality Reexamined, Amartya Sen (1992) explains how 
all normative theories of social justice in the last century – liberal, utilitarian, rights-based – rely 
on equality of certain elements, including: equal liberty, equal income, equality of primary 
rights, equality of treatment, equality of capabilities. The elements that should be distributed 
equally in such theories are usually those valued by all individuals. In many of the theories 
analyzed by Sen, equality seems to have some type of intrinsic moral significance (Feldman 
2003). 
However, as Shelly Kagan argues, equality can be a consequence of desert in that it is 
justified by the judgment that individuals deserve some sort of equality (Kagan 1999). The 
intrinsic moral value should be in desert, not in equality, because according to Kagan and 
certain desert theorists (e.g., Feldman 2003), equality is simply overrated. Egalitarianism cannot 
redress all injustices or put aside the broad range of distinctive genetic, physical, intellectual, or 
social traits of individuals; and it does not make all contexts fair. In some cases, the application 
of equality may paradoxically result in inequity. For example, paying everyone equal wages 
would not account for different skills, competencies and social value attributed to certain forms 
of work, nor would it address the fact that people have different obligations with regards to 
healthcare bills or child care, for example. Equal wages for all, without other targeted unequal 
distribution would likely create highly problematic and inequitable outcomes. 
In many cases of authorship, perfect equality in distribution may lead to significant 
injustices. The implication that all team members deserve equal authorship is that they should 
all receive equal credit and have the same responsibility for the work. This distorts the reality of 
the research and writing processes. In disciplinary or multidisciplinary research teams, 
individuals reasonably make different contributions and are consequently responsible to 
differing degrees for different tasks. Equal distribution of authorship fails to acknowledge the 
level or amount of contribution, and it renders meaningless the assignment of responsibility 
within the research team that is central to research integrity. Individuals would ultimately be 
made less responsible and accountable for their work, and authorship distribution would be less 
meaningful. Equal authorship for all contributors is simply contrary to a quantification of 
contribution through authorship to differentiate the competent from incompetent, the productive 
from the unproductive and the deserving from the undeserving.  
I do not think, however, that we should throw out the baby with the bathwater and omit 
fairness from ethical theory regarding authorship. Desert allows for the comparative assessment 
and ranking of individuals, and would benefit from a mechanism whereby each individual’s 
contribution is evaluated in the same way. This equal treatment in the evaluation of 
contributions can promote greater fairness in authorship distribution. It is not necessary to 
choose between fairness and desert in the context of distribution of authorship in academia 
since these can and should coexist.  
 
Why use fair recognition of individual contribution as a reasonable principle? 
I will argue that fair recognition of contribution is a reasonable and necessary principle 
for authorship distribution for one very important reason: it is important in promoting and 
ensuring a certain level of impartiality and non-discrimination. To this effect, Sen writes: 
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Need for some egalitarian formula in defending a theory indicates the significance 
widely attached to non-discrimination, which can be seen as being motivated by 
the idea that in absence of such a requirement a normative theory would be 
arbitrary and biased. There seems to be a recognition here of the need for 
impartiality in some form for the viability of a theory (Sen 2009, p.293). 
Fairness and justice are brought to bear in finding non-arbitrary ways to distribute goods, merit, 
and resources. An evaluation mechanism that considers individual contributions in the same 
manner through a less biased lens could limit exploitation in authorship distribution while still 
promoting productivity in research. Although not every team member would be ranked equally, 
each individual would be treated fairly and measured in the same manner (through 
contribution). 
Promotion of neutrality and non-arbitrariness are elements of justice that are already 
considered valuable in academia. However, as previously mentioned, there exist important 
power dynamics and ranking in the academic hierarchical structure designed to recognize 
knowledge and learning, e.g., professor-student, senior researcher-junior researcher. Yet, it is 
important that rank (seniority) not be a factor in authorship distribution; rather, the focus should 
be on the link between responsibility and authorship. This would reduce the impediment to 
entry-level advancement in academia since students or technical staff do occupy a lower 
position in the hierarchy. The emphasis on responsibility and not rank could reduce exploitation 
of the less experienced and duly recognize the contribution of senior researchers. Using rank as 
a criterion would only serve to encourage an even more hierarchical environment where power 
would be concentrated within an established elite, arguably threatening the scientific process.  
 
 Limitations of fair recognition of individual contribution 
Although fair recognition seems like a reasonable criterion to help in the distribution of 
authorship it has important limitations, most of which are practical in nature. Even well 
intentioned individuals may introduce bias by unconsciously favoring personal or professional 
interests instead of considering each contribution in an equal fashion. In weighing contribution, 
an individual may unconsciously be influenced by association, friendship or reputation and thus 
attribute a higher standing in authorship than deserved. The literature on conflicts of interest 
shows that, regardless of good intentions, favoring personal or professional interests is often 
unconscious (Chugh, Bazerman, and Banaji 2005). Managing such interests within the team 
becomes all the more important. 
Cases where individuals contribute equally and consequently deserve equal authorship 
can also present real challenges. As previously noted, alphabetical order of authorship can be 
considered to be unfair in that individuals with a last name that starts at the beginning of the 
alphabet will be favored, and those with a last name at or near the end disfavored. The 
alphabetical listing of names cannot reflect or represent equal contributions. As such, it would 
be important to provide a statement declaring that all individuals have contributed relatively 
equally. Individuals who work together often may change the authorship order in their next 
publication to share the opportunity to be named first and also add a declaration statement about 
equal contribution. The next section argues that transparency would represent or explain more 
accurately equal contributions and the associated responsibilities of team members. 
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Transparency 
The contributorship model has been considered as an effective method of increasing 
transparency (Smith 2012; Smith 1997; Tice 2005). By disclosing the specific tasks of 
individual contributors, it serves to clarify individual responsibility and accountability for 
various tasks. For example, a fictional contributor statement might read as follows: Mary 
Tomasson contributed to the project design and the writing of the article; Julie Madisson 
contributed to data collection, analysis and writing; and John James contributed to all steps of 
the research. However, while contributorship does provide additional detail and a measure of 
increased transparency, it does not necessarily reveal who deserves the most merit and 
responsibility. We do not know who made the greatest contribution, did the most work or 
deserves first author? While data collection is mentioned, it might represent 50% of the work in 
one project and only 5% of the work in another project. An individual may have made 
numerous small contributions in all phases of the research, which amount to relatively little 
work or work of lesser qualitative value, compared to that of other individuals who have 
completed only one task that represents for example, the bulk of the data collection and analysis 
in a data intensive project.  
In order to better reflect the reality of the collaborative enterprise in authorship order, 
transparency can be applied through explanatory notes or disclaimers. According to Akhabue 
and Lautenback (2010), the disclaimer that more than one individual has contributed equally 
has become a more common practice in medical journals. Clarity as to the amount of work or 
the level of contribution benefits deserving individuals in their career advancement. As I will 
discuss further, transparency disclaimers would be useful in explaining other types of 
distribution than equal contribution.  
 
Why use transparency as a reasonable principle? 
Transparency can be considered a reasonable principle in the distribution of authorship 
for a number of reasons. First, it may limit confusion and misperception; declarations that state 
whether individuals are ranked in decreasing order of contribution, or are listed in alphabetical 
order and have all contributed equally, reveal more about the research. If we consider 
contribution to be linked to merit, responsibility and accountability through desert (as argued 
previously), transparency would further clarify and enhance these elements. If there is minimal 
or no transparency about authorship order, readers are left with their own individual 
assumptions which may be wrong. 
Typically individuals tend to follow or be influenced by the prevailing norms of 
authorship within their respective discipline, field, or subfield. As a result, depending on their 
discipline, field or subfield, individuals may interpret authorship order differently. In a study of 
authors who published in the journal Radiology, authors were perceived to be named in 
decreasing order of credit in a majority of cases (70%); this leaves little or no recognition or 
prestige for the last author (Slone 1996). However, in a survey of promotion committee 
members at American Medical Colleges regarding perceptions about authorship order, the first 
author in a three person byline was seen to have made the most contribution, while the last 
author’s contribution on a five person’s byline was perceived to be the greatest (Wren et al. 
2007). These two studies from different disciplines illustrate very different perceptions 
concerning the significance or importance of the last author. I suggest that competing or 
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differing perceptions will occur with greater frequency in multidisciplinary collaborations 
where there are no agreed upon norms or standards of authorship, making it all the more 
important to consider reasonable, ethical practices for multi-authored multidisciplinary research.  
Transparency is also a reasonable and practical concept for authorship because it could 
facilitate more representative and flexible blending of various methods of authorship ordering 
that better reflect the contributions within diverse types of research teams. At first glance, one 
might suggest using Occam’s razor and imposing a single method of authorship order to 
simplify the process (Resnik 1997). However, a single method and order of distribution is 
simply not realistic since there is no one model for team research. Teams are incredibly diverse 
in terms of size, discipline(s), organizational structure and epistemological background, and so a 
single approach to authorship distribution would likely lead to unfair situations. For example, a 
ranking order that fails to reflect the equal contribution of each member of a 5 person team 
would be unfair and misrepresent the work of the team members. In a large team of more than 
500 individuals (e.g., in High-Energy physics), comparing the contributions of so many (besides 
maybe the first few or last authors) would be ridiculous; the difference between the 300th and 
301st author is of no significance. However, listing individuals in alphabetical order might seem 
equally unjust to the individual who did considerably more work than the rest of the team. To 
avoid these impracticalities and injustices, an approach that blends or borrows from different 
practices may be more useful and effective. For example, noting that that all authors except the 
first few and last have contributed equally may provide a more accurate and fairer way of 
distributing credit to members of a very large team. With sufficient transparency, we may blend 
or apply different orders, as long as they are not seen as unreasonable from the viewpoints of 
the team members (e.g., first three authors in order of contribution, the rest in alphabetical 
order, supported by a clear acknowledgement).  
If all individuals agree to greater transparency and multiple or mixed authorship orders, 
there is a better chance that this will carry over to the reward system in the field and a greater 
variety or mixed types of evaluations. For example, researchers working in multidisciplinary 
research teams may reflect these diverse orders in their CV, possibly with a section reserved for 
authorship in alphabetical order and another presenting authorship in ranked order. This would 
introduce greater precision and fairness in the assessment of authors engaged in 
multidisciplinary work and ultimately, would contribute to greater accuracy in the reward 
system.  
Lastly, transparency may help foster fairness and ethical behavior since unfair or 
unethical behavior shuns discovery and publicity. For example, I mentioned that Biagioli (1999) 
explained how authorship has served to exploit certain individuals and minimize their 
contributions. This undermines the social dynamic which enhances team synergy and 
productivity. To reduce exploitation, authorship can and should reflect reality (as much as 
possible), and factor in both the social activity within a collective environment, as well as 
acknowledge individual elements. While ill-intentioned individuals can always hide 
wrongdoing, the promotion of continuous transparency as a principle will invite individuals to 
better communicate how contribution is distributed.  
Limitations of transparency 
It would be presumptuous to think that authorship order and transparent disclaimers 
would fully reflect all interactions involved in the conduct and publication of research; 
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disclaimers can only tell part of the story. Individuals may be limited by journals that refuse to 
print or that minimize authorship disclaimers. Although I am unaware of journals openly 
banning disclaimers, the content and format requirements of journals can influence the 
communication of disclaimers. For example, a disclaimer written at the end of a paper (or even 
at the bottom of the cover page) in a very small font will draw less attention than one placed 




The notion of collegiality has not received much attention in the RCR literature, which is 
odd given the increasingly collaborative nature of research. When looking for a definition of 
collegiality in the university context, I came across certain organizational concepts for 
collegiality, especially in the fields of sociology (Lazega 2001; Crozier 1969; Smyth 1991; 
Waters 1989), management (Bess 1988) and higher education (Brett 1997; Nuttall 2012). These 
might have evolved to some extent as a result of Weber and Durkheim’s debate on the 
sociology of organizations, where collegial models were discussed in detail. According to 
Waters (1989), Durkheim envisaged a normative function in an organizational form of 
collegiality where workers should share power in decision-making and thus promote a form of 
stability. Conversely, Weber saw collegiality as a negative element that would counter the 
bureaucratic, efficient and rapid decision-making, mainly in political affairs (Waters 1989). 
Regardless of whether it is welcome or not in an organization, shared decision-making is often 
considered as central to collegiality. 
Since a research team may not exactly function as a highly structured organization but 
rather as a more organic, knowledge network of individuals, I have shied away from defining 
collegiality in strictly organizational terms. I will thus rely on the lesser known, but I think more 
fitting notion of collegiality developed by John Bartholomew Cavanagh (2010): “collegiality 
relates to the right to be heard, implying voice and democracy, as well as both the right and duty 
to influence processes and decisions for the common good through participation and 
consultation in the given social context” (Cavanagh 2010, p.1). This interpretation of 
collegiality fosters collaborative engagement, dialogue and shared knowledge, agreement, and 
research results. It is not an administrative procedure or an organizational protocol, but rather a 
continuous and more dynamic interaction that allows team members to address issues and 
achieve results collaboratively. 
 
Why use collegiality as a reasonable principle in authorship distribution? 
I use collegiality as a reasonable principle in authorship distribution to offset 
individualism and promote a productive context wherein a healthy level of competition can 
flourish through collaboration. Earlier, I highlighted a paradox in research: in a world where 
competition and individualism have traditionally dominated, there has been an emergence of 
multidisciplinary research teams which necessitate collaborative teamwork and open 
communication. But if individualism is rampant and the “survival of the fittest’’ attitude is 
overwhelming, teamwork and sharing of authorship becomes an almost impossible task. 
However, the quest for recognition in research and academia has also given rise to greater 
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multidisciplinary collaboration, and productive teamwork has increasingly become the forum 
for innovation. As such, it is in most researchers’ best interests to promote collegial relations (at 
least within their teams) while living with the reality of “publish or perish”.  
Individualism has received its share of criticism in various fields of research. 
Communitarian ethicists such as Alasdair MacIntyre (2013) or Micheal Walzer (1983) have 
criticized the individual ethics of much of liberal political philosophy, while Feminist ethics and 
Care ethics have been particularly important in countering the overemphasis of autonomy and 
individualism in bioethics (Friedman 2000). However, none of these perspectives have been 
applied to authorship or work in research integrity. As a result, the team as a collective entity 
and the collegial interrelations important to a cohesive, well-functioning group (including 
decision-making regarding authorship distribution) have rarely been addressed in normative 
theory.  
A second reason to consider collegiality is that it can help in recognizing that group 
dynamics and the interdependence of individuals in collegial relationships can contribute to the 
important personal and professional growth of each member. Teamwork and collaboration are 
central topics of discussion in organizational psychology (Baker, Day, and Salas 2006; 
DeChurch and Mesmer-Magnus 2010; Deutsch 2003) and management (West 2012; Galegher, 
Kraut, and Egido 2014). The concept of synergy suggests that an organization of many people 
(in our case, a research team) has the potential to be much more than simply the sum of its parts 
(Katzenbach and Smith 1993). Kurt Lewin, a pioneer of organizational psychology and action 
research states that the group creates a “dynamical whole that has properties of its own” (Lewin 
1948, p.60) In a collegial team, individuals can and should recognize that the team dynamic 
(mainly the relations between individuals) can support and enhance their individual contribution 
beyond what they could achieve alone. This awareness of others and the value of collaborative 
relationships could also have a positive influence on negotiations or agreement regarding 
authorship distribution.  
Lastly, collegiality will facilitate the creation of fair procedures11 tailored to the team’s 
context. As previously demonstrated, Scanlon’s contractualism can help in identifying the 
wrong or unreasonable behaviors for distribution of authorship. However, research team 
members must agree upon one of the many available authorship distribution schemes, i.e., the 
one that is not only ethically reasonable but that also best applies to their situation. It is 
important that a collegial process of open discussion and negotiation engage all team members 
in arriving at satisfactory agreement. I submit that collegiality along with the principles 
previously discussed will indeed be useful to team members with differing perspectives and 
from various disciplines. A collegial environment would provide a more open forum for all 
members regardless of status, discipline, or country of origin; individuals would feel more 
comfortable in sharing knowledge, and in collaborating with less reservation or fear of 
exploitation. When the arrangement or agreement among members is reasonable as well as 
mutually beneficial, individuals might well temper (not suppress) their personal goals, and 
competitiveness, in order to benefit the collective, i.e., the team.  
                                                
11  Since this paper focuses on theoretical elements of value in authorship distribution, I will not outline the 
procedures that are necessary in decision-making regarding authorship distribution since I consider it more of a 
practical consideration. A procedure will, however, be developed in my future work. 
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Limits of Collegiality 
Collegiality has some important practical limitations in team research. Understandably, 
it would be more feasible to implement a culture of collegiality in a small 5 person team than in 
large teams located in different geographic locations with different cultures, and social and 
professional norms. Greater effort is required for such large teams to make it possible for 
individuals to feel that they have a fair opportunity to be heard. As fictional (but realistic) 
examples, there may be team meetings in the different geographic areas where sub-teams exist; 
or, representatives may be elected to enable the representation of different individuals in the 
sub-groups. The notion of collegiality and the procedures appropriate to various types of group 
to distribute authorship will clearly need to be fleshed out in an eventual framework for it to be 
useful to practitioners.  
 
Summary 
 The following table is a summary of the justifications and limitations of the conceptual 
principles proposed for ethical authorship distribution. It is important to note that while certain 
principles may be more important in certain contexts, principles suggested are not mutually 
exclusive and will most likely be more helpful when applied together. For example, in a large 
team setting individuals may agree to distribute authorship in decreasing order of contribution. 
They may consider that certain individuals deserve more credit and accountability then others. 
It is only through collegial conversation that individuals may arrive at such a decision. To limit 
discrimination, fair recognition is useful. Lastly, declarations may be used to give meaning to 
the order used. There will most likely be different processes that may be used to decide 
authorship and its order depending on the context of multidisciplinary research (type of team, 
size of team).  
 
Table 1: Conceptual principles applied to authorship distribution in multidisciplinary teams 
Principles Interpretation in 
authorship context 
Justifications Certain limitations 
Desert The worthiness that results 
from contributing to a 
research project.  
•  Links merit and accountability 
•  Merit promotes innovation and 
production 
•  Accountability promotes 
responsible research 
•   Facilitates the evaluation of 
contribution 
•  Appraisal helps in ordering 
authorship. 
•   Promotes productivity and 
excellence in research 
•  May create excessive competition 
•  Difficulty in appraising 
contributions of different natures 
(e.g., technical or intellectual) 
Equality  Each individual’s 
contribution is evaluated in 
the same way through an 
unbiased lens 
•   Promotes less partial bias and 
fairness. 
•  Reduces discrimination 
•  Mitigates disagreement within 
teams 
•  Unconscious bias due to conflict 
of interest of evaluators 
•  Equal contribution not 
represented through sequencing 
order of authorship 
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Transparency Declaration to explain the 
meaning of authorship order 
•  Clarity as to the nature and amount 
of contribution 
•   Provides flexibility for different 
orders to coexist 
•  May reduce incidence of unethical 
or unfair behavior which shuns 
discovery and publicity 
•  Disclaimers are often brief and 
can only represent part of 
complex teamwork and 
contributions 
•   Journal content or formatting 
practices may undermine or 
negate the utility of disclaimers 
Collegiality The right to be heard through 
a democratic process and a 
right to influence said 
process for the common 
good 
•  Counterbalances individualism and 
excessive competition 
•  Helps develop mutual recognition 
of perspectives and practices 
•  Openness favors negotiation and 
agreement in authorship decisions 
•  Contributes to team synergy 
•   Facilitates the creation of fair 
evaluation procedures 
•  Geographic distance 
•   Size of teams 
 
CONCLUSION 
At the outset of this conceptual analysis, I briefly described the context of authorship in 
academic research collaborations. I emphasized the critical importance of authorship in 
academia as it often defines the success of individuals in research; and I noted that the literature 
on authorship ethics has mainly discussed unethical practices such as guest, gift, and ghost 
authorship. I also discussed how the growing number of authors on papers creates general 
‘obfuscation’ concerning who did the work, who is responsible and how authors are ordered. 
The norms and practices of authorship distribution and order vary considerably between fields 
of research and disciplines, raising particular challenges for individuals from multidisciplinary 
research teams who seek to publish together. Journal editor organizations such as ICMJE and 
WAME (and to a lesser extent, COPE) have taken the initiative and developed more specific 
authorship guidelines that are gaining increasing attention in the literature on authorship ethics. 
However, while they may prescribe exclusion and inclusion criteria for authorship in the 
biomedical or health sciences, the determination of authorship order (especially in 
multidisciplinary teams) remains particularly vague. Moreover, there are rarely any argued 
conceptual justifications to support the proposals in these guidelines. Without adequate, 
practical guidance that is based on sound theoretical grounds, individuals are left confused 
about the justifications for deciding authorship and its ordering.  
I have argued that Thomas Scanlon’s contractualism provides a useful theoretical 
foundation to justify principles that would contribute to the ethical distribution of authorship in 
multi-authored publications, and especially in multidisciplinary teams. Scanlon’s theory states 
that the acts or behaviors in a given context are unethical if disallowed by principles that 
individuals would reasonably accept in a general agreement. In the specific context of 
authorship distribution in academia, contractualism allows us to justify a variety of principles 
such as desert, just recognition, transparency and collegiality. As Scanlon argues, the morality 
of an act must always be evaluated (deemed unreasonable or not) while also considering the 
circumstances (context) in which it takes place. Some of the principles conceptualized in this 
paper may have different interpretations depending on contextual specificities. For example, 
collegiality in a group of five individuals will no doubt differ from that in a team with 500 
individuals spread around the world.  
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As with any theoretical or conceptual approach, contractualism and the ensuing four 
principles I examined (i.e., desert, just recognition, transparency and collegiality) have their 
limitations, as has been acknowledged throughout this paper. Moreover, I have not presented a 
detailed working ethical framework, procedure or process that could be used in practice by 
multidisciplinary research teams, as this is beyond the scope of this paper. Empirical data 
regarding the specificities for multidisciplinary team research and their impact on authorship 
issues is needed in order to better understand the diversity of team practices and contexts. Along 
with the detailed theoretical foundations provided in this paper, such empirical data would 
provide the basis for the development of a practical framework to support ethical and non-
arbitrary decision-making concerning authorship distribution in multidisciplinary team 
publications. The result would be a decision-making framework that is sufficiently flexible so 
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